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Following his seminal book designed for the general public, The Lost World
of Genesis One: Ancient Cosmology and the Origins,1 John Walton has written
this more technical study, Genesis One as Ancient Cosmology,2 to convince the
expert or the informed theologian. His contention is that, as with the rest
of the ancient world, the focus of the Genesis creation accounts concerns
only the functions of the cosmos and has, therefore, nothing to do with its
material origins (ix). Indeed, the creation story is to be interpreted, according
to Walton, strictly in temple terms as a liturgical document, rather than as a
document reporting the actual origins of the cosmos.
In order to make his case, Walton proceeds methodically. In section 1, he
presents the characteristic features of ancient cosmogonies, demonstrating
that these methodologies emphasize function—that is, as notions of existence
and nonexistence, of separation, of the place of the gods and of humans,
and of the relationship between the cosmos and the divine rest—rather
than material origins. An important aspect of the functional nature of these
cosmogonies is that they all present the cosmos as a temple. The creation
texts are thus to be understood liturgically as functions of worship rather than
as reports of the historical and material origins of the cosmos.
In the second section, the author applies the same paradigms used in the
previous section to his analysis of Genesis 1 in order to determine to what
extent the notions observed in ancient Near Eastern cosmogonies are related
to the biblical accounts. His analysis of Genesis 1 leads him to conclude that
the functional nature of the text relies on its connection to the temple. Thus
“the entire cosmos is viewed as a temple designed to function on behalf of
humanity.”3 This view has bearing on the meaning of the Sabbath, the day of
rest, which is, according to Walton, to be understood as the moment when
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God takes his place in the temple as ruler of the cosmos that he has “set in
order” (and not “created”).
The conclusion of the book reminds the reader of the extent and
nature of the intersection between Genesis 1 and other ancient Near Eastern
cosmologies, particularly what is shared with or distinct from the Egyptian
and Mesopotamian perspectives. Walton proposes that although Israelite
cosmology fits its geographical and historical environment, it contains no new
ideas, especially in regard to its functional emphasis. The greatest differences
between the Israelite and the Egyptian and Mesopotamian cosmologies,
he contends, is that the divine and cosmic functions are not related in the
Genesis 1 account the way they are in other parts of the ancient world (e.g.,
existence and theomachy).
Walton conducts his demonstration with great pedagogy, always defining
his notions and concluding each step with a clear and helpful summary. The
reading is rigorous, but often interesting.4 There is no doubt that his most
important contribution is “the realization that the Genesis account pertains
to functional origins rather than material origins and that temple ideology
underlies the Genesis cosmology.”5 The main problem, however, concerns
the validity of that “realization.” I will, therefore, focus on this aspect of his
discussion. Indeed, a number of observations suggest that this fundamental
assumption about the functional nature of these accounts, whether in the
ancient Near Eastern world or in Genesis 1, is not as compelling as his
argument may imply.
Since Walton begins with the notion of functionality in the ancient Near
Eastern world, it is fitting to begin my evaluation here. It is indeed important
to assess to what extent ancient Near Eastern cosmologies have functional
cosmogonies and, if they are functional, to understand why and in what way
they are so. Thus, for example, the Egyptian Memphite text of creation states:
“He created sleep to end weariness, waking for looking after food . . . remedies
to end illness, wine to end affliction . . . wealth for truthfulness, poverty for
falsehood.”6 Walton also finds an example in Mesopotamian cosmology. Here
created things are listed by their function, with the text implying that this
functionality is for the benefit of humans. Thus the creation account in the
Sumerian text, The Exploits of Ninurta, focuses on the functions of production
(e.g., the creation of herbs, honey and wine, cedar and cypress trees), which
are designed “for you.”7
This attention to the functionality of creation, rather than to its
ontological reality, accounts for the difficulty of distinguishing between the
See, e.g., his comments on “the Spirit of God” (ibid., 148-149).
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idea of creation and the idea of reorganization, “for when functions are
involved, creation and reorganization overlap considerably.”8 This confusion
also explains why the creation is identified with the notion of “destiny,” since
references to creation are concerned only with the actual destinies in the
present world.9
However, just because the functional nature of creation is emphasized in
these ancient Near Eastern texts, it does not mean that this property is also
necessary for the interpretation of the Genesis text. Functionality pertains to
the specifically mythological nature of these texts and does not apply to the
specifically historical and antimythological nature of Genesis 1. When the
Egyptian view of creation is described as an unfolding process—that is, a
becoming (hprw) and hence functional process10—it is due to its mythological
nature. Creation is here described as a becoming from the gods. It is because
the gods of the ancient Near Eastern world are inside the cosmos and not
outside of it11 that creation is viewed here as a function. Since the gods
identify with the functions of the cosmos (e.g., sun, moon, water, heaven, and
earth), they are divine. Thus these creation accounts will be concerned with
functional activity. Not only is the notion that the creation of humans was
primarily for serving the gods12 a foreign idea, but it is, in fact, contrary to the
biblical paradigm that suggests the opposite. God created humans not for the
function of serving him and giving him food, but on the contrary that he may
serve them and give them food (Gen 1:29-30).
In his systematic treatment of Genesis 1, Walton supports his thesis of
function in a number of ways. I will now critique them:
1. Genesis 1:1 and bara’ (“create”). The assumption that the verb bara’
(“create”) does not imply the creation of material objects is highly subjective
as it stumbles on the evidence found throughout the OT: heavens and earth
(Gen 1:1), creatures of the sea (Gen 1:21), people (Gen 1:27), pure heart (Ps
51:2), you (Isa 43:1), cloud of smoke (Isa 4:5), starry host (Gen 1:14), ends of
the earth (Job 28:24), wind (Job 28:24), and covenant people (Deut 32:6) are
in their respective contexts material realities. The reference to the Piel form to
justify the idea of separation (Gen 1:4, 7) hardly holds as this verb may rather
belong to another root than the one used in the Qal and the Nifal.13
2. Genesis 1:2 and the precosmic condition. Nothing in the text or in the semantic
baggage suggests that the expression tohu wabohu refers, as Walton contends,
to the state of disorganization and lack of function of the world. Instead,
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it describes a state of emptiness, as suggested through the onomatopoeia
and ontological negativity, and, as also suggested by its associations with the
words ’ayn (“not”) (Isa 45:19; Jer 4:23) and ’efes (“nothing”) (Isa 40:17) and
its Genesis 2 parallel section, the second creation story, with the words ’ayn
(“not”) (Gen 2:5) and terem (“before, not yet”) (Gen 2:5).14
3. Days 1-3 and “day” and “night.” The creation of “day” and “night”
(functions), following the creation of light (not a function) shows that the
creation of function is subsequent to the creation of a material entity. In
addition, that the firmament (raqi‘ ) is described in the functional terms of
separation does not necessarily mean that the function was created rather
than the matter. This sequence suggests instead that here again function
is subsequent to matter, for function depends on the reality of matter.
Ironically, while Walton notes the parallel between the separating function of
the Hebrew raqi‘ (“firmament”) and the function of the Egyptian god of the
air, Shu, who separates the earth from the sky,15 he still maintains the critical
view that the ancient Israelites understood the raqi‘ as a solid material. Walton
is somehow aware of this contradiction since, in the light of this parallel, he
immediately warns “against a view that is too material.”16
4. Genesis 1 and “it was good.” The Hebrew word for “good” (tov) means
more than the idea of efficiency, as argued by Walton. The word tov also
includes the idea of aesthetic, that is, “beautiful,” which better fits the regular
context of “God saw” (Gen 1:1, 4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25, 31). It thus implies a
visible material reality and not just the invisible operation that “the cosmos
functioned well.”17
5. Days 4-6 and time. On the fourth day of creation week the account
introduces the function of time before the reference to the celestial bodies,
thereby suggesting that here the idea of function may be its main focus
since it implies that the celestial bodies already exist. This interpretation
does not, however, support Walton’s thesis that the creation account is all
about function. The fact that the idea of function is clearly intended here
and explicitly indicated suggests instead that when function is not intended,
such an interpretation is not justified. It is, for instance, significant that the
mention of the creation of the sea creatures (Gen 1:21) precedes the mention
of their reproductive function (Gen 1:22). This sequence shows that once
again function is subordinate to creation and is not to be substituted in its
place, as Walton contends. Likewise, the creation of humans, which presents
14
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their material constitution in the parallel text of creation (Gen 2:7), excludes
the possibility defended by Walton that only their spiritual function, the imago
Dei, was meant. Such a dualist interpretation would not only contradict the
plain sense of the account, which implies the creation of physical organs with
their functions of eating and reproducing, it would also be completely at odds
with the general monistic views of the Hebrew Scriptures. Walton is correct
in his observation that the imago Dei does not contain “divine ingredients,” an
idea characteristic of Near Eastern mythological views of ex-divino creations.
The nonbiological connection with the deity does not exclude, however, the
material presence of physical elements and does not constitute, therefore, a
serious and convincing argument on behalf of the spiritual functionality of
the imago Dei.
6. Day 7. Walton’s thesis that God’s rest on the seventh-day Sabbath of
creation does not mean “rest,” but, on the contrary, “an act of engagement,”18
implicitly questions the validity of resting on the seventh-day Sabbath and
stumbles on the common-sense and plain meaning of the word “rest”
associated with the Sabbath. God’s injunction to humans to “rest,” that is,
to disengage from activity, is a clear indication of the meaning of “rest” here
intended for the Sabbath of God. Even if “rest” is incompatible with the
divine nature, the fact that God enters into human “space” pertains to his
will and capacity of incarnation in order to meet humans where they are.
God’s rest in Genesis 2 is also fundamentally different from that of the gods
in other Near Eastern texts. While in the biblical account God rests because
he “ended His work” (Gen 2:2), the Egyptian and Mesopotamian gods do
not rest, but, on the contrary, begin to rule the world, which is interpreted by
Walton as the work of creation. Walton’s identification of the gods’ settling
into the temple to rest is also problematic, since the word “rest” is never used
to characterize this divine settling in Genesis 2. Instead, this stage is described
as the beginning of the gods’ activities. The ancient Near Eastern cosmos
becomes functional after the rest,19 while in Genesis 1 the world is made
functional before the Sabbath rest (a point that Walton consistently makes).
Note also that the gods’ rest is only achieved when humans are created for
the purpose of working for them,20 while in the biblical story God rests after
he created humans. Not to mention the anachronism, Walton associates the
Sabbath rest in Genesis 1 with the creation described in Genesis 2,21 which
belongs rather to the sixth day when God creates humans and animals and
then plants a garden.
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The parallel between the building of the temple and the creation of
the cosmos, although well documented, does not necessarily imply that
the creation accounts are concerned only with the function of worship. As
Walton notes, “this element is not explicit in the text,”22 and is, therefore,
“uncertain.”23 In fact, to paraphrase Walton, “it might be more likely that the
association is the reverse;”24 namely, that the temple inauguration is modeled
after the Genesis account. Interestingly, the way this association is worded in
the Scriptures suggests indeed that it is creation that precedes the temple and
not the other way around: “He built His sanctuary like the heights, like the
earth which He has established forever” (Ps 78:69). This simple observation
suggests the precedence of creation over the temple. The creation accounts
do not imply the temple, but rather the temple implies creation. The function
of worship is inferred from creation, but the “functions” of creation are not
inferred from worship (Neh 9:6; Pss 95:6; 102:18).
Walton concludes his essay hoping that his contribution will help “in the
clear definition of the nature of biblical authority and revelation.”25 Indeed it
does, or at least it inspires a reflection about the complex process of revelation.
The comparison between the biblical creation story and its ancient Near
Eastern parallels suggests not only points of connection between them, but
also significant differences, which have been skillfully and insightfully brought
out by Walton. One of them, the intention of functionality in the texts, has
some bearing precisely on the issue of revelation. Walton is correct when he
notes that the ancient Near Eastern texts of creation are essentially functional;
but what he fails to realize is the reason why they are so, while the Genesis
accounts of origins are not. While the biblical creation story intends to report
on the event of origins, the ancient Near Eastern texts are only bringing
opinions from the point of view of the one who observes the functions
of creation. While the biblical creation accounts refer to the origins of the
cosmos in which humans are only an infinitely small part, the ancient Near
Eastern accounts focus on their world and are essentially anthropocentric.
The former pertains to the revelation about the event of creation, while the
latter pertains to a posteriori human experience of that creation.
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